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Free Bank Failures In New York and Wisconsin: 
A Port£olio Analysis 
Rolnick and Weber £ound that a sharp decline in asset prices led to 
bank panics and, ultimately, bank £ailures during the £ree banking 
era. An examination 0£ New York and Wisconsin £ree bank port£olios 
prior to a £all in asset prices indicates banks that weathered the 
turmoil held signi£icantly di££erent port£olios than closed banks. In 
general, solvent banks held more loans and specie, and issued more 
deposits and less banknotes than closed banks. 
1 
I. Introduction 
The impact a:f. deregulation an banking markets is a key 
concern a£ policymakers. Many economists assert that increased 
competition in banking would result in mare bank :failures, large 
bank creditor losses, and possibly bank panics. Support 
their contention is based, in part, an the experiences o:f. 
:for 
the 
Free Banking Era <1838-1863>. The conventional view depicts the 
period as having :few restrictions, numerous bank :failures, large 
notehalder losses, and unscrupulous bank managers. However, 
recent studies by Rolnick and Weber <1982,1983,1984) 
Economopoulas <1988) have :found evidence ta the contrary 
and 
and 
suggest that the primary cause a:f. bank :failures was :falling asset 
prices and not :fraudulent behavior. 
What is key in these studies is the link between :falling 
bond prices and bank :failure . It has been suggested by Ralnick 
and Weber <RW> 
valuable asset 
that one o:f. the part:f.alio restrictions provided 
in:f.ormation to bank creditors. This restriction 
required :free banks ta hold long-term bonds ta back a short-term 
liability (banknotes) where each banknote issued was redeemable 
into specie on demand. RW theorized that during periods o:f. 
:falling band prices, notehalders, aware o:f. the depreciated 
reserves, attempted to redeem their banknotes. 1 I:f. the band 
reserve and remaining assets were insui:f.icient ta redeem the 
outstanding banknotes, either the stockholders would have ta 
provide additional capital or the bank would have ta de:f.ault an 
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the payment. RW suggest that the de£ault option was pre£erred to 
the investment 0£ additional capital. 
Although the RW £alling bond price hypothesis links the 
bond-secured banknote to bank £ailures, it does not £ully explain 
which banks £ailed. Their hypothesis provides some insight into 
individual bank £ailures when a single bond or selective group 0£ 
bonds £all in price. In their study (1985> on interregional 
contagion, they showed that bewteen 1860 and 1861 bank runs 
occured in Wisconsin while none occurred in New York. They 
contended that a selective run on Wisconsin banks was due to the 
bond port£olios held by the £ree banks. Although both Wisconsin 
and New York banks were required to hold bonds, New York banks 
were restricted to hold only NY and US bonds, while Wisconsin 
banks could hold a variety 0£ state bonds, many 0£ which were 
southern bonds. The events leading up to the Civil War depressed 
southern bond prices over 501., thus leading to a run on Wisconsin 
banks. These events had little e££ect on NY and US bond prices 
and thus, little e££ect on the New York banking market. 2 
Although their "selective run" hypothesis explains interstate 
£ailure rates, it does not explain intrastate £ailure rates. RW 
data shows that during the 1860-61 period the 52 banks that 
exited in Wisconsin held over 701. 0£ their bond port£olio in 
southern bonds while the 55 banks that stayed open held only 64/. 
in southern bonds. Given the signi£icant southern bond ho+dings 
0£ all Wiscionsin banks, it would seem that some other aspects 0£ 
the £ree bank's £inancial position would help explain which banks 
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£ailed. In New York, thirteen banks <5Y. 0£ the market> exited 
during the same period, even though New York banks held only NY 
and US bonds. What then may have caused these banks to exit? 
This study is concerned with determining the £inancial 
characteristics that distinguished £ailed £rom solvent banks. 
The cause 0£ individual bank £ailures would probably be 
linked to the liquidity management 0£ the bank. Even though the 
£ree banknotes were backed by a bond reserve, the reserve was not 
accessible to the bank until the bank returned a portion 0£ its 
circulation. Thus, the value 0£ the non-bond reserve assets 
would be crucial to understanding individual bank £ailures. 
Economopoulos <1986} gives preliminary evidence on the impact 0£ 
non-bond reserve assets: states requiring high specie reserve 
were less likely to have bank £ailures than states allowing low 
specie reserve. This work supports the contention that the 
port£olio 0£ banks may have decided the £ate 0£ the £ree bank. 
One means 0£ distinguishing ex ante poorly managed £ree 
banks £rom soundly managed banks is to use multivariate 
discriminant analysis <MDA>. Altman (1968>, Sinkey <1975} and 
others have shown with MDA that £inancial ratios 0£ solvent banks 
were signi£icantly di££erent £rom £ailed banks even though 
impropriety may have been a £actor in bank £ailures; thus, the 
application 0£ MDA to £ree bank £inancial data could provide 
insight into the possible causes 0£ bank failures. 
Two £ree banking states exmained by RW, New York and 
Wisconsin, provide an excellent case study of £ree bank failures 
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£or several reasons. First, neither state imposed a specie 
reserve requirement, thus yielding a sample 0£ banks which had 
£lexibility in their asset selection. Second, both states 
experienced numerous bank £ailures, thus providing a suitable 
sample to employ MDA. Finally, the study 0£ the New York and 
Wisconsin £ree banking experience allows us to examine bank 
£ailures in di££erent banking markets. In 1860, the average New 
York bank held over $1 million in assets •nd serviced over 12,000 
customers while the average Wisconsin bank held under $150,000 
and serviced less than 7,200 customers . 3 
II. Assets and Liabilities 0£ Free Banks 
The New York £ree banking law, enacted in 1838, provided the 
legal £ ramework £or many 0£ the £ree banking states. Unlike 
previous banking legislation, the £ree banking laws exposed £ree 
banks to public scrutiny <Economopoulos, 1987>. In general, £ree 
banks were required to publish at least an annual report in the 
local newspapers detailing the types 0£ assets and liabilities 
held, and the capital and surplus (retained earnings> account. 
The typical items required in a published balance sheet are 
present in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. 
Typical Free Bank Balance Sheet 
Assets: 
Loans and Discounts 







Deposits on Demand 




The amount 0£ banknotes held by the £ree banker was linked 
to the amount 0£ bonds purchased. Free bankers could obtain 
banknotes by trans£erring quali£ied assets to the state banking 
authority. Wisconsin accepted state and £ederal bonds as 
collateral £or bank notes as long as they were 0£ good standing 
in the £inancial markets. A state was considered in "good 
standing" as long as the state did not de£ault on an interest 
payment. New York restricted eligible bonds to their own state 
and the £ederal government. In return £or the bonds, the banker 
would receive banknotes equal to the market value 0£ the 
securities or the par value, whichever was the lowest at the time 
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0£ remittance. 
New Yo:r-k also allowed mortgages on unincumbered land as 
legal reserves £or banknotes. The amount o:f notes issued to the 
bank equaled the mortgage value, but the mortgage could not 
exceed two-£i:fths o:f the land's assessed market value ... This 
restrictive assessment o:f mortgages was due, in part, to the 
unreliable appraisals o:f the mortgaged property. In the 
Comptroller's report o:f 1849, the comptroller shared his concerns 
about the mortgage-backed banknote: 
"All the experience o:f this department shows that 
mortgages are not the best security :for this purpose ... 
the lands mortgaged may have been appraised too high, 
or some legal de:fense to a suit o:f :foreclosure, all 
conspire to depreciate their value in the estimation o:f 
purchasers, when o:f:f ered £or sale at auction on the 
:failure o:f a bank ... Capitalists are cautious about 
purchasing (mortgages>, and the consequence is that 
they have sometimes sold :for less than 20% on the 
amount secured by them . .. " 
Since the mortgage-back provision was never repealed, it appears 
that the legislature did not share the comptroller's 
apprehensions. 
Once the :free bank was in receipt o:f the banknotes they 
could exchange them :for loans and discounts, £or specie, or 
additional bonds. The bank was required to redeem each banknote 
into specie on demand. Re:fusal o:f a noteholder's request :for 
specie resulted in :for:feiture o:f banking privileges. Such a 
harsh penalty provided an incentive :for the prudent bankers to 
maintain "adequate" specie reserves in accord with the liquidity 
needs o:f the moment.s 
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Besides banknotes, many banks used deposits as a secondary 
source 0£ £unds to support loan demand. The amount 0£ deposits 
issued by the bank depended on the economic base 0£ the 
community. In general, deposits accounted £or a small percentage 
0£ the liabilities in a country bank while deposits accounted £or 
over hal£ the liabilities in a city bank. Economic historians 
have suggested two reasons £or this. 6 First, the city banks 
developed a better network £or clearing checks which reduced user 
cost 0£ checks. Second, city banks recognized the bene£its 0£ 
having country bank deposit accounts. Country bank deposits were 
a source 0£ £unds £or earning assets as well as security £or the 
exchange 0£ country banknotes. Some city bankers attracted 
country bank deposits by paying interest on such bank deposits. 
Free banks that paid interest on deposits varied the rate 
according to the short-term commercial paper rate. However, 
payment 0£ interest on deposits was not the general practice 
among bankers at that time. 
One bene£it of having access to deposits was that bankers 
were not required to back the deposits with bonds or specie, 
although prudent bankers would no doubt hold sufficient specie to 
meet daily demands. Thus, a £ree bank with a deposit base 
afforded the banker some flexibility of asset selection. 
One disadvantage of issuing deposits was the relative 
riskiness of this kind of bank credit. One 0£ the common 
provisions of the free banking laws was the first-lien rights 0£ 
the banknote holder. In the event 0£ a bank £ailure, all 
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proceeds £rom the sale 0£ the bank's assets were £irst applied to 
the banknote holder, then the depositor. This £irst lien 
provision and the rule that one unredeemed note would close the 
bank provided an incentive to depositors to monitor the £inancial 
position 0£ the bank. Thus, a £iscally irresponsible bank with a 
large in£ormed deposit base would likely have £aced a signi£icant 
drain 0£ specie prior to or at the onset 0£ a period 0£ £alling 
bond prices. 
III. Free Bank Failures, Free Bank Management, 
Ratios 
and Financial 
Given the bond-secured note restraint and the nature 0£ 
the type 0£ loans issued by the £ree bank, it would seem likely 
that £ree banks that purchased loans instead 0£ bonds with 
banknotes were more likely to handle liquidity risk. Although 
bonds and mortgages were held as reserves £or banknotes, they 
could not be considered as "£ree" reserves. In a liquidity 
crisis, the bonds could not be sold £or specie until the £ree 
bank returned an equal amount 0£ banknotes to the banking 
authority and banknotes could only be obtained by drawing down 
specie reserves or £rom additional capital subscriptions by 
stockholders. Thus, the creditworthiness and liquidity 0£ the 
non-reserve asset was crucial to the expected value 0£ a banknote 
and ultimately, to the success 0£ the £ree bank. 
The liquidity management problem 0£ the £ree bank that 
relied on banknotes as a primary source 0£ £unds was very similar 
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to the problem £aced by commercial banks today. Like current-
d a y 
demand deposits, banknotes had no explicit maturity date or 
interest rate expense. However, £or a given interest rate, the 
implicit average maturity 0£ banknotes depended on the average 
circulation period. 7 The longer the circulation period 0£ a 
banknote the longer the average maturity. In this case, the 
liquidity problem £acing £ree bank managers was to match the 
average circulation period with the average maturity 0£ the loan 
port£olio thereby minimizing specie reserves. Specie reserves 
would then support any unanticipated decrease in the average 
circulation period or any unexpected credit losses. 
The practice 0£ matching the maturity 0£ the loan port£olio 
with the anticipated liquidity need was practiced by some £ree 
bankers. Loans during the period were typically short-term - 3 
to 12 months; this allowed bankers some measure 0£ £lexibility in 
asset management. 8 By reducing the average maturity, the £ree 
bank could anticipate an increase in liquidity within a given 
period. Peter Temin <1975> showed that N.Y.C. bankers adjusted 
their loan port£olios to meet seasonal liquidity demands. 9 
Margaret Meyer <1931,p.54) £ound that lending policies 0£ banks 
were also in£luenced by economic conditions; as trade and 
commerce improved, credit terms were relaxed and loans were 
extended £or as long as 12 months. 
A simple example can illustrate the liquidity risk 
exposure problem. Assume that two £ree banks bought bonds with 
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their capital and used them to issue banknotes. Bank A used the 
banknotes to purchase loans that became due the £allowing day, 
payable either in the bank's own notes or in specie. Bank B used 
the banknotes to purchase additional bonds. Let us assume that 
interest rates increased the next day causing bond prices to 
decline by SOY.. In the absence 0£ credit risk, Bank A would have 
su££icient £unds to redeem the outstanding banknotes while Bank B 
would be £arced to close or would have to secure additional £unds 
£ram an outside source, most likely the stockholders. Thus, Bank 
A's purchase 0£ loans and discounts helped reduce liquidity 
risk. 10 
The preceding discussion 0£ the £ree bank's internal 
operations suggests that several ratios can be calculated that 
re£lect the risk e x posure 0£ the £ree bank and the port£olio 
£lex ibility 0£ £ree bankers in both New York and Wisconsin. 
(1) Liquidity ratios. A high specie to banknote and deposit 
ratio would indicate lower liquidity risk exposure than a 
low specie to banknote and deposit ratio. 
<2> Asset ratios. High specie to total asset, specie to bonds, 
and loans to bonds ratios would indicate lower liquidity 
risk exposure than low specie to total assets, specie to 
bonds, and loans to bonds ratios. 
(3) Flexibility ratios: high deposit to total debt, and high 
deposit to banknote ratios would indicate greater 
flexibility £or port£olio managers than low deposit to total 
debt, and low deposit to banknote ratios. 
One additional ratio is calculated £or the New York £ree 
banks: the mortgage to total asset ratio. Based on the 
conjecture 0£ the New York Comptroller, a high mortgage to total 
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asset ratio would suggest a higher reserve-port£olio risk than a 
low mortgage to total asset ratio. The higher the reserve-
port£olio risk the higher the likelihood 0£ £ailure. 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The £ocus 0£ this study is to assess the £inancial position 
0£ the £ree banks prior to closing. Financial statements £or a 
I 
sample 0£ banks were compiled £rom the New York and Wisconsin 
bank commissioners' annual reports to the state legislatures that 
was published in the United States Congressional Serial Sets. 
The banks were divided into two categories: solvent and closed. 
In New York, 289 banks were listed as solvent banks, banks that 
remained in operation as 0£ the beginning 0£ the National Banking 
Act in 1863; 162 banks were listed as closed banks, banks that 
exited be£ore 1863. In Wisconsin, 61 banks were listed as 
solvent and 69 were listed as closed. Most 0£ the Wisconsin 
closing occurred between June 0£ 1860 and June 0£ 1861. 
From this population 0£ solvent and closed banks, a sample 
was compiled according to several criteria. First, only banks 
that closed within twelve months 0£ their last £inancial 
statement were selected; this l~mitation provides us the most up-
to-date in£ormation on the banks prior to closing. ' ' In 
Wisconsin, the reports were published annually. In New York, the 
publication £requency varied £ram 21 months to 9 months; thus 
some closed banks were excluded £ram the sample. 
Second, the closed banks were matched with solvent banks 
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:first according to equity structure, then geographical location 
< E.>i ther city or country bank>, and lastly, asset size. In the 
Wisconsin sample the matching process was simple, since most 
banks in the system were o:f comparable size and the same equity 
structure. However, some Wisconsin closed banks were not matched 
because a suitable solvent bank could not be :found. The 
di:f:ference in average asset size between the groups as a 
percentage o:f average asset size was approximately 7Y.. 
In New York, the matching process was not as exact. New 
York allowed two equity structures to exist. I:f there was only 
one stockholder, the minimum capital was set at $50,000, but i:f 
there was more than one stockholder, the minimum capital was set 
at $100, 000. 1 2 The matching process was also limited by 
available data; :forty-two banks exited prior to 1846 - a period 
when annual reports were incomplete. The lost o:f data due to the 
pre-1846 closings and the one year reporting period limitation 
lead us to relax the asset size criteria in order to compile an 
adequate sample; the average di:f:f erence in asset size as a 
percentage o:f total asset size was 37Y.. 
Based on the above criteria :fi:fty-two pairs o:f :free banks 
were selected :from the New York population and 44 pairs o:f :free 
banks were selected :from the Wisconsin population with asset size 
ranging :from $50,000 to over one million. <See Table 1. ) 13 
One caveat concerning the :financial analysis is in order. 
Many o:f the banks closed during periods o:f :falling asset prices. 
In the New York sample, 35 o:f the 52 banks closed during a period 
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o:f :falling asset prices while in Wisconsin all the banks closed 
during a period o:f :falling asset prices. 1 • I:f the bank's report 
date occurred during a period :falling assets prices, one may 
contend that the statements o:f closed banks <ex post> should 
re:flect signi:ficant di:f:ferences :from solvent banks. The 
di:f:f erences could re:flect asymmetry o:f in:formation; that is, 
large depositors, aware o:f the bank's :financial position at the 
beginning o:f the decline, bailed out prior to the published 
report. Thus, the analysis 0£ these banks would not necessarily 
show how prepared the :free banks were prior to a :fall in asset 
prices, but rather how unprepared they were. The statements o:f 
17 o:f the 52 paired New York banks were issued during a period o:f 
:falling asset prices while all o:f the Wisconsin bank statements 
were issued during a period 0£ :falling asset prices. 
A total 0£ thirteen ratios were calculated :for solvent and 
closed banks one year prior to exit. A di:f:f erences in means test 
was per:formed on the ratios o:f the two classes o:f banks. Since 
two or more ratios may interact and may better distinguish a 
solvent bank :from a :failed bank, stepwise multivariate 
discriminate analysis was also per:formed. This procedure 
compares the dispersion o:f one or more ratios across the three 
classes o:f banks. 
A. Mean-Di:f:ference Tests 
Prior To Exiting 
The results 0£ the 
on Solvent and Closed Banks One Year 
mean-di:f:ference test reveal some 
signi:ficant di:f:ferences between closed and solvent banks. (See 
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Table 2. > The comparison between solvent and closed banks shows 
signi£icant di££erences in most 0£ the asset ratios, except for 
the mortgage-total asset ratio, £or both states. Solvent banks 
generally had a higher proportion 0£ loans and specie, and less 
bonds relative to total assets than closed banks. Solvent banks 
in both states also held three to £our percent more specie 
relative to demand liabilities than did closed banks. 
Surprisingly, there was no statistical support £or closed New 
York banks having a higher mortgage to total asset ratio than 
solvent New York banks. These results tend to support the 
hypothesis that closed banks had higher lev els 0£ liquidity risk 
exposure and that the composition 0£ the reserve portfolio had 
little influence on bank closings. 
Solvent banks also had higher 
ratios than did their counterparts. 
loans and discounts to bonds 
However, the total loan to 
bond ratio is insignificant. <The difference between the two 
ratios is the addition of loans to directors and other non-
traditional loans to loans and discounts. } One possible 
explanation £or the disparity between the loan and discount to 
bond and the total loan to bond ratios is that closed banks had a 
significant amount 0£ loans to directors. In a period 0£ stress, 
these loans would be highly illiquid 
demise 0£ the bank. 
and thus contribute to the 
The evidence provided by the equity and liability ratios is 
not as conclusive as that provided by the asset ratios. While 
most 0£ Wisconsin's ratios are significant, only the deposit-
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total debt ratio is statistically significant for New York. In 
Wisconsin, solvent banks generally issued a lower proportion of 
their debt in banknotes, held a higher proportion of their debt 
in deposits, and were more leveraged than £ailed banks. The 
statistical support £or solvent banks having more deposits 
relative to banknotes indicates that solvent banks were in a 
better position to reduce liquidity risk by purchasing loans. 
The signi£icant loan to bond ratio suggests that free banks did 
indeed purchase loans with their deposits. 
In summary, there were signi£icant di£ferences between 
solvent banks and closed banks one year prior to failure. The 
evidence lends support to the contention that closed banks 
assumed higher liquidity risk exposure than solvent banks. 
B. Stepwise Multivariate Discriminant Analysis 0£ Solvent and 
Closed Free Banks 
One drawback of the univariate test is that it does not 
capture the interaction among the variables. For example, low 
specie reserves combined with a large bond portfolio may be a 
better basis £or distinguishing between closed banks and solvent 
banks. MDA captures this interaction among the variables. In 
this study the variables are represented by the financial ratios 
and the groups compared are the solvent and closed banks. T h e 
stepwise procedure employed in this study examines the relative 
dispersion 0£ each variable and selects those variables that 
maximize the separation between the groups. One advantage 0£ 
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stepwise MDA is that the relative contribution 0£ each variable 
is measured against the other variables and the variables added 
into the model are those that "best" discriminate between solvent 
and closed banks. 1 s 
The £irst variable that is selected provides the greatest 
univariate discrimination between the groups. This variable is 
then paired with each 0£ the remaining variables, one at a time, 
to £ind the combination 0£ variables which produces a linear 
relationship that best discriminates between the two groups. The 
procedure continues to select variables, one at a ti me, and 
includes each one in the linear model until all the variables are 
selected or the remaining variables do not signi£icantly 
contribute to the discriminatory power 0£ the model. 
From the 
is derived: 
selected variables, a linear discriminate £unction 
where weights (WJ) are assigned to each predictor variable ( X1 ) 
so that a discriminate score ( Z, ) £or each bank is estimated. 
<In this case the predictor variables are the selected ratios. ) 
The estimated discriminate scores are used to classi£y the banks 
into the two classes 0£ banks. The accuracy 0£ classi£ying the 
banks by the discriminate £unction provides one indication 0£ the 
discriminating power 0£ the selected variables. 
The results 0£ the analysis are presented in Table 3. 
Included in Table 3 is the Wilk's lambda, an indicator 0£ the 
overall discriminating power 0£ the £unctions; the canonical and 
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standardize.>d coe.>fficie.>nts, indicators of the.> absolute.> and 
re.>lative.> contribution of each variable; and the classification 
matrices using a holdout group. For both state.>s, two variables 
were selected as discriminator: deposits-total debt and deposit-
banknote ratios. The loans and discounts-total assets ratio was 
selected in the New York sample.> while total loans-total assets 
ratio was selected in the Wisconsin sample. It is interesting to 
note that :for each state the variables entered in the same order, 
suggesting consiste.>ncy o:f the.> discriminating variable.>s between 
the two classes of banks . A fourth variable entered each 
:function; in New York the total loans-bond ratio e.>ntered and in 
Wisconsin the bonds-total assets entered. 
The selection of the deposit-debt ratio suggests that 
deposits provided a stable source 0 £ :funds and allowed free bank 
managers :flexibility in asset selection. In both states, the 
relative contribution of deposits as a discriminator is at least 
twice that o:f the next most important variable. The sele.>ction o:f 
the loan-total asset ratio is consistent with the liquidity 
exposure hypothesis. However, the evidence also indicates that a 
balanced asset port:f olio, as noted by the negative loan-bond 
ratio in New York and by the positive bond-asset ratio in 
Wisconsin, was important in distinguishing between solvent and 
closed banks. <A positive sign indicates a high predictor 
variable is associated with a high discriminant score; the higher 
the discriminant score the higher the likelihood o:f that score 
being associated with a solvent bank. > This implies that bond 
18 
holdings, and the corresponding note issue, did not necessarily 
increase the likelihood o.f .failure as long as they were supported 
by other earning assets. 
The predictive power o.f the discriminate .function is also 
presented in Table 3. Since there is an upward bias in 
classi.fying banks that were used to develop the discriminant 
:function, the Lachenbruch technique was used to classi.fy the 
banks. Lachenbruch (1967) devised a discriminate classi.fication 
technique :for small samples which classi:f ies each observation 
based on the remaining observations. This procedure reduces the 
biasedness o.f the classi.fication. In New York, seventy-.four 
percent o.f the solvent banks and :fi£ty-seven percent o.f the 
closed banks were classi.fied correctly, while in Wisconsin 
seventy-one percent o:f the solvent banks and seventy-.five percent 
o:f the closed banks were correctly classi.fied. These results are 
better than the sample proportions which would be the best 
estimate o.f population priors; thus validating the variables as a 
reliable discriminator o.f solvent and closed banks. 16 
To illustrate the results o:f MDA process, £our Wisconsin 
banks were classi£ied as having varing degrees o:f £inancial 
strength. <The balance sheets o:f these banks are given in Table 
4. ) Given the discriminant .function and the £inancial data o.f 
each bank, discriminant scores were calculated. The scores were 
evaluated at the group's mean and then classi.fied. City Bank o.f 
Kenosa was listed as having the "best" £inancial position. The 
probability o.f misclassi£icing City Bank as a closed bank was 
19 
2. 4Y. At the other end 0£ the -:financial strength spectrum was 
Mechanics' Bank. The probability 0£ misclassi£icing Mechanics' 
as a solvent bank was 8.5Y.. Oshkosh Commerial and Iowa County 
represented the typical solvent and £ailed banks, repectively. 
It appears that banks most likely to succeed were banks that were 
doing "legitimate" business in loans and discounts while banks 
least likely to suceed were issuing an abnormally high amount 0£ 
promissory 





it also raises 
uncollateralized loans> and £ew 
evidence supports the proposed 
questions about bank's port£olio 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The evidence £ram New York and Wisconsin £ree banks 
i nd icat e s that liquidity risk one year prior to exit may have 
been a contributin g £actor to free bank failures. The Wisconsin 
and New York data show strong support for the hypothesis. The 
comparison 0£ -:financial ratios one year prior to £ailure, which 
occurred during a drop in asset prices, indicates signi£icant 
di£ferences between solvent and failed banks. 
able to mitigate liquidity risk by issuing 
holding a higher proportion of assets in 





banks. Deposits held by the £ree bank also distinguished solvent 
£ram failed banks; solvent banks held more deposits than £ailed 
banks. 
Several issues are raised £ram these results which would new 
avenues £or research. Does the evidence tend to support the 
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conventional notion o:f inherent instability o:f private note 
production? 1 a The inherent instability hypothesis is based, in 
part, on two interrelated aspects o:f the :free banking 
experiences: <1> the :fraudulent behavior o:f bankers <commonly 
known as wildcat bankers>, and <2> the overissue o:f banknotes. 
The overissue o:f banknotes traditionally linked to wildcat banks. 
This tradition appears to have result :from observations made by 
some o:f the contemporaries o:f the period. The 1853 Annual Report 
o:f the New York Banking Superintendent, states 
"the only :failures o:f banks that have taken place in 
the state for the last eight years by which billholders 
have obliged to suffer loss have been banks o:f 
circulation, generally located in remote parts o:f the 
state, and owned by brokers and speculators. not a 
:failure has occurred in any legitimate bank ... " 19 
Although the evidence in this study suggests that "banks o:f 
circulation" were most likely to fail, it can not be construed 
that such banks were also wildcat banks. Rolnick and Weber 
(1982) and Economopoulos <1988> :found that fraudulent behavior 
was generally the exception, not the rule. However, their 
studies do not address individual banks of circulation. 
If the intention of bankers was not to defraud the public 
what basis did they have :for their operations? Is it possible 
for legitimate banks to be "banks o:f circulation"? White (1984> 
and Selgin <1988) have set up theoretical models on :free banking 
and provide insight to these questions. From the supply side, 
bankers would maximize pro:fits and by issuing banknotes and 
deposits until the marginal cost o:f the issues were equal. One 
21 
0£ the major costs 0£ issue would be liquidity cost <that is, the 
maintenance 0£ specie reserves £or redemption>; another cost was 
that 0£ attracting deposits. Under such an optimization problem, 
"banks 0£ circulation" could legitimately arise in the market 
where the cost 0£ attracting and maintaining deposits was 
prohibitive; these banks would most likely be located in "remote" 
areas. 
What is crucial to their legitimacy is that noteholders 
<demanders> are monitors 0£ the issuing bank. 20 I£ noteholders 
do not discriminate between issuers, then it is possible £or 
selective banks to overissue or possible be an illegitate wildcat 
bank. Although £ar £rom conclusive, some evidence indicates that 
note discrimination was practiced in New York and Wisconsin. In 
Ne w York , n ote discriminat i on was institutionalized by requ iring 
all "country" banks to have redemption agents in either Albany or 
New York. As long as the agent bank was not conspiring with the 
bank 0£ issue, it would seem likely that the agent bank would 
monitor the note i ssuer. No such law was enacted in Wisconsin, 
but there is evidence of note discrimination 0£ Wisconsin banks 
by Chicago Banks. 21 
I£ these banks were organized to meet market needs, then 
what would explain there higher likelihood 0£ £ailure? One 
possible explanation is that banks were closely monitored by the 
market; both competing banks and depositors had an incentive to 
monitor. In a downturn, competing banks aware 0£ the market 
value 0£ the banks assets would increase liquidity demands 0£ the 
22 
note issuing bank.a a Depositors, likewise, would increase 
liquidity demands. Unlike previous banking regulations, the £ree 
banking law 
noteholder. 
gave £irst lien rights to all 0£ the assets to the 
Thus, the subordinate nature 0£ deposits required 
either £inancial compensation £or the risk taken by the depositor 
or required greater assurance 0£ £iscal responsibility 0£ bank 
managers. Since most banks did not pay interest on deposits, it 
seems likely that depositors were monitors 0£ £ree bank 
operations. Some 0£ these banks, especially banks 0£ 
circulation, did not have the assets to support an increase in 
liquidity demand. Consequently, many 0£ these banks probably 
closed. The evidence in this study, however, only provides 
preliminary support £or monitoring; £urther study 0£ £ree bank 
monitoring would be necessary 
c o uld be made. 
be£ore any de£initive conclusions 
23 
Endnotes 
1. Rolnick and Weber actually stated that the cause was due to a 
£all in asset prices, and used bond prices as a proxy £or asset 
prices. This study re£ers to these periods as periods 0£ £alling 
bond prices. 
2. See Rolnick and Weber <1985) £or the bank and bond price 
data. It should be noted that RW separated exiting banks into 
those that redeemed notes below par and those that redeemed notes 
at par. This study makes no distinction. 
3. The source 0£ the estimates came £rom the U.S. Bureau 0£ the 
Cenus, and the New York and Wisconsin bank commissoners' reports 
0£ 1861. 
4. The original law speci£ied that the mortgage could not exceed 
hal£ 0£ the land's market value. For a complete listing 0£ New 
York banking laws £rom the beginning to the National Banking Act, 
see Cleavland and Hutchinson <18641. 
5. In general, bankers were not prosecuted 
liquidity crises, such as the one that occurred in 
banks suspended bank note redemption. 
during general 
1857 when all 
6. Miller <1920,p.109) presents a discussion on the use 0£ checks 
in cities and Meyers <1931, pp.120 - 1251 states that the practice 
0£ paying interest on country bank deposits occurred primarily in 
New York City banks. 
7. I£ Rolnick and Weber's £alling asset price hypothesis is 
correct, then it is expected that the average circulation period 
0£ a banknote would decline as interest rates increased. 
8. Several studies have estimated loan maturities prior to 1913. 
Gibbons <1858, p.200) estimated the average discount period £or 
New York Banks prior to the Civil War was 40 days. In Dailey's 
<1934, p.499) examination 0£ Chicago banks be£ore 1890, banks 
limited loan maturities to 60 days in peak periods. However, 
Moulton (19181 pointed out that bankers renewed at least 40Y. to 
50Y. 0£ their unsecured loans, implying that the e££ective 
maturity could be longer than the estimates by Gibbons and 
Dailey. 
9. Don Daily <1934> £ound that when credit demands were at their 
peak, bankers were reluctant to loan as long as 60 days. 
Although the Daily study £ocused on the post-£ree banking period, 
it lends support to the Temin £indings. 
24 
10. The assumption concerning no credit risk is restrictive. 
One would expect that a portion 0£ the loan port£olio would 
de£ault a~d consequently, noteholders would sustain losses. 
Noteholders 0£ Bank A would sustain losses equal to noteholders 
0£ Bank B i£ the de£ault rate 0£ Bank A's loan port£olio was SOX. 
11. The primary source 0£ bank closings came £rom the Bank 
Commissioner's Reports 0£ the states. All 0£ the Wisconsin banks 
were identi£ied through these reports. In New York, two 
secondary sources were needed to identi£y bank closings: Rolnick 
and Weber <1982) and Dillistin <1946>. 
12. Due to the limited population size, some individual banks 
were matched with banking associations; there were twenty-six 
closed individual banks in the sample, ten 0£ these were matched 
with banking associations. 
13. The consistency in results between Wisconsin and New York 
indicate that asset size did not in£luence the distinguishing 
characteristics 0£ £ailed banks. See the Appendix I £or the list 
0£ banks in the samples. 
14. For the sample period, bond prices decline signi£icantly in 
1854, 1857, and 1860. This study de£ines the periods 0£ £alling 
asset prices according to those used by Rolnick and Weber <1984). 
They £ound that Indiana bond prices decline by 33% between June, 
1854 and December, 1854, by 26X between March, 1857 and October, 
1857, and Missouri bond prices £ell by 57% between June, 1860 and 
June, 1861. 
15. The selection criteria corresponds to a one-way analysis 0£ 
variance. A£ter the £irst variable is selected, the one-way 
analysis 0£ covariance is per£ormed on the remaining variables. 
In other words, the remaining variables are conditional to the 
selected variables. The selection process continues until the 
remaining variables do not signi£icantly discriminate between the 
groups. 
16. The prior probabilities are determined by the 
proportion 0£ the subgroup to the sample population; 
study, 50 percent 0£ the solvent and £ailed banks. 
relative 
in this 
17. Promissory notes was included in New York banks' balance 
sheet under bonds, but was a seperate account on Wisconsin 
balance sheets. In order to make a valid comparision between the 
states, promissory notes was not included in the "loan and 
discount" account in the analysis. 
18. See King (1983) £or a detail review 0£ the issues regarding 
private note issue. 
25 
19. From the context 0£ the superintendent's statement, the 
superintendent used the term "bank 0£ circulation" as a polite 
synonym £or "wildcat bank". Wildcat banks were noted £or their 
inaccessible locations. 
20. Se Selgin <1988, pp.42-47) and White (1984, p.7-9> on a 
detailed discussion on monitoring and note issue. 
21. Bankers' Magazine <September, 1858, p.235) published a 
statement £ram the Bankers 0£ Chicago showing their 
dissatis£action with selective Wisconsin Banks. 
22. It is reasonable to assume 
assess the loan de£ault risk 0£ a 
de£ault risk. 
that a monitoring bank 
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New York and Wisconsin Free Bank Sample 
Asset Size and Location 
Wisconsin New York 
<In Thousands> City• Country 
50 to 100 32 0 16 
101 to 150 40 0 15 
151 ta 200 10 0 8 
201 ta 300 2 l 18 
301 to 400 2 l 11 
401 to 500 0 2 4 
501 to 1000 2 10 8 
over 1000 0 10 0 
Total 88 22 82 
Includes Bu££alo, Albany, and New York City. 
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Table 2 
Di££erences in Ratio Means of Solvent and Closed Free Banks 
in New York and Wisconsin 
Ratios New York 
Asset Ratios: 
Lns & Dis/Total Assets<LDTA) .1056* 







































LDTAs > LDTAc 
LNTAs > LNTAc 
SPTAs > SPTAc 
MTAs < MTAc 
BDTAs < BDTAc 
LNBDs > LNBDc 
LDBDs > LDBDc 
SPBDs > SPBDc 
SPTDs > SPTDc 
BNTDs < BNTDc 
DPTDs > DPTDc 
DPBNs > DPBNc 
*, **, ••• Signi£icant at the one, five, and ten percent levels. 
aThe null hypothesis states that £or any measure the di££erence in means 
0£ the underlying populations 0£ solvent and closed free banks is equal to 
zero: XXXXj - XXXXi= 0, where XXXXj denotes the mean of the jth measure of 
the ith class 0£ bank. 
b Wisconsin did not allow free banks to purchase mortgages. 
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TABLE 3 
Stepwise Discriminate Analysis 




Loans and Discounts/Total Assets 










Wisconsin New York 
Absolute Standardized Absolute Standardized 
Coe.f.ficients 























Balance Sheets 0£ Wisconsin Banks 
January, 1861 




High Prob Mean Prob Mean Prob High Prob 
City Bank, Oshkosh Iowa Cnty Mechanics' 
Kenosh Commerial Bank Bank 
Assets 
Loans and Discounts $ 136,895 $ 31,386 $ 6,992 $ 0 
Loans to Directors 0 2,788 4,000 0 
Bonds 34,146 34 ,000 26,500 30,000 
Promissory Notes 0 2,000 42,874 25,000 
<Other than L&D> 
Specie 1,693 5,711 3,523 0 
Cash Items 12,505 358 845 0 
Due :from Banks 7,607 3,500 11,120 0 
Notes 0£ Other Banks 15,624 14,662 4,176 0 
Other 14,891 1 773 3,524 $ o 
Total Assets $ 223,361 $ 96,178 $103,552 55,000 
Claims 
Capital $ 100,000 $ 30,000 $ 50,000 $ 25,000 
Banknotes 24,264 29,135 24,843 23,700 
Deposits 90,883 25,536 14,696 0 
Due Other 8,214 11,507 14,013 6,300 






NEW YORK FREE BANK SAMPLE 
NAME OF 
CLOSED BANK 
IType•I ASSET SIZE ILAST 
I I LAST REPORTIREPORT 
Agriculture Bk A 
Artisans Bk NYC A 
Bank o/t Union I 
Bk o/t Interior I A 
Bk o/t Union, NYCI A 
Bk 0£ Albany A 
Bk 0£ Central NY A 
Bk 0£ Corning A 
Bk 0£ Hornelvle I 
Bk 0£ New Rochell! I 
Bowery Bank,NYC I A 
Brockpart Exe I 
Camden Bank A 
Catarack Bk A 
Central Bk, NYC A 
Chemung Cty I 
Comercl bk,Alg L 
Dairymen's B I 
Drovers Bk L 
Dunkirk Bank I 
Eighth Ave, NYC A 
Empire City, NYC A 
Farmers B. S Cty A 
H White L 
Hamiliton Ex I 
Hollister Bk A 
Island Cty Bk,NYC A 
J. Rumsey & Co. I 
James Bk A 
Kirkland Bk I 
Knickerback, NYC A 
Lockport B&T A 
Manu£act Bk,Roch A 
Mechanics Bk,WTN I 
Medina Bk I 









































































!Citizens Bk, NYC 
!Wyoming Cty Bk 
IBk 0£ Rondout 
!Oriental Bk 
!Commercial Bk Alb 
IBK ATTICA 
IBk 0£ Kinderhook 




















IBk 0£ Chemung 
IEast River Bank 
Geo Was Bk 
Watertown B&L 
Burnett Bk 
Exchanke Bk, Lockpt 




Lake Shore Bk 
Bk 
Citizen Bk. F-0 ' 
Marine Bk, Bu££ 
Atlantic Bk 
P.R. West£all 
Mech & F,Ithaca 
Cuyler's Bk 
Chatham BK 
BK 0£ Danville 
Genesse Cty Bk 
Oneida Valley 
' 
Bk 0£ Canandaigua 




























170,000 1850 I IW. Shermans Bk 151,000 
258,000 
114,000 
Monroe Bk I 
NY Stock Bk I 
National Bank A 
O. Lee & Co A 
Onandaga Bk A 
Ontario Cty Bk I 
Oswego Cty I 
Pine Plains A 
Powell Bk A 
Prattsville BK I 
Putnam Valley I 
Queen City I 
State, Sang I 
Su££olk B, NYC A 
























I I Bank 0£ Newmark 
I I Su££olk Cnty 
I I Union Bk, Alb 
I IBK 0£ Syracuse 
I I Bk 0£ Fayetteville 
I I Smith ' s Bank 









I I Delaware Bk 
I !Farmer ' s Bk, Hudson 
I I Black River 
I I Bk 0£ Pawling 
I I Merchant Bk, EC 
I !Bk 0£ Cayuga Lake 
I I Grocers' Bk 
I I Lyons Bk 













I 195, 000 
471,922 
NAME OF 
CLOSED BANK * 
ARTIC BK 
BK OF ALBANY 
BK OF APPLETON 
BK OF B DAM 
BK OF COLUMBUS 
BK OF FODULAC 
BK OF HORICON 
BK OF OCONTO 
IOWA COUNTY 
BK OF PORTAGE 
BELIOT SAVINGS 
CHIPPEWA BK 
CITY BK, B. DAM 
CLARK CTY 
COMMERIAL BK 






























WISCONSIN FREE BANK SAMPLE 
REPORT DATE: 1/7/1861 
I ASSET SIZE l I MATCHING SOLVENT lASSET SIZE 




















































BK OF PARIRIE 
BK OF JEFFERSON 
SHAWANAW 
BK OF WISCONSIN 
ELKHORN 
WALWORTH CTY 
BK OF BELIOT 
ROCK CTY 
l I BK OF RACINE 
I I GREEN BAY 
I I CITY BK, PRESCOTT 
l l BK OF OSHKOSH 
l l BK OF RIPON 
l I CORN PLANTERS 
l l BK OF MANITOWOC 
l l SAUK CTY 
l l BK OF SPARTA 
l I BK OF MONROE 
l l BK OF SHEBUYGAN 
I l BK OF WHITEWATER 
l l SCROIX VALLEY 
l l WIS BK, MAD 
l I COLUMBIA CTY 
l I MONROE COUNTY 
I l DANE 
I l BK OF WATERTOWN 
l l FMRS & MERCH 
l I ROCKVILLE 
l l FRONTIER 
I l FARM & MILLERS 
l l BK OF FOX LK 
l l BK OF GRANT CTY 
l l BK OF WEGAWEGA 
l I FOREST CITY 
l l GERMAN 
l I JEFFERSON CTY 
I I CITY BK, KENOSA 
I I BK OF GREEN BAY 
$322,000 
152,000 
103,000 
63,000 
178,000 
96,000 
105,000 
118,000 
125,000 
135,000 
66,000 
100,000 
128,000 
130,000 
107,000 
96,000 
119,000 
123,000 
76,000 
87,000 
108,000 
114,000 
68,000 
81,000 
89,000 
70,000 
136,000 
80,000 
143,000 
105,000 
208,000 
174,000 
121,000 
105,000 
64,000 
677,000 
138,000 
169,000 
115,000 
82,000 
131,000 
189,000 
233,000 
131,000 
135,455 
